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Jurisdictional Statement 
The Court is vested with jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j) 
Issues Presented for Review and 
Standard of Appellate Review 
Appellee B. Ray Zoll ("Zoll") is presenting no issues for review. 
Mm i i i "i ill i lr riqi ei-", '"illi ippi II in! I niin|l i\ I i is l l t ' tn i r i "r f jsr l^tnn' I 
suggested standards of review. 
In regards to Castleton's Issue # l \ Issue #2 and Issut: - i h o 
««.nr-M t standard nl ii MHJV\I I , 11 nil llir- Findinr : 
only be set aside upon a showing of "clear erroi order to set aside the 
Trial Court's Findings of Fact, this Court must "decide that the factual 
findings made * adequately supported by the record, 
resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial 
court's determination." State v. Pena. 869 t- i 
1994)(citations omitted). The application of the facts to law is "reviewable 
nondeferentially for correctness." Pena, 869 P.2d at 938. Contrary to 
Castit.. 
1
 Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Zoll was not serving as 
legal counsel for Castleton at the time Zoll represented another client in the 
collection of a debt from Castleton? 
2
 Whether the trial court erred in concluding that the matters at issue in 
Zoll's previous representation of Castleton were not substantially factually 
related to the matter on which Zoll represented a client adverse to 
Castleton? 
3
 Whether the uidi court erred in concluding that Zoll did not breach his 
fiduciary duties of loyalty, confidentiality and good faith to Castleton? 
l 
limited because this Court has a "special interest in administering the law 
governing attorney ethical rules" under Houghton v. Dept. of Health, 962 
P.2d 58, 61 (Utah 1998). This is not an attorney disqualification case nor is 
it an action brought by the Bar for violations of ethical rules. This is a civil 
case of alleged attorney malpractice for breach of fiduciary duty giving rise 
to a claim of money damages. The "Utah Rules of Professional Conduct are 
not designed to create a basis for civil liability." Archuleta v. Hughes, 969 
P.2d 409, 413 (Utah 1998). The Trial Court's discretion should not be 
reduced because a civil cause of action has been alleged against an attorney. 
The Trial Court should therefore be granted broad discretion because of the 
number of the factual disputes presented at trial and because the Trial Court 
was in a better position to consider and weigh the evidence. Houghton v. 
Deot. of Health. 962 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1998). 
In regards to Castleton's Issue #44 , the issue is based upon the 
Findings of Fact of the Trial Court and the Trial Court's application of the law 
to those facts. The Findings of Fact of the Trial Court can only be set aside 
upon a showing of "clear error." Pena, 869 P.2d at 935. The application of 
the facts to law is "reviewable nondeferentially for correctness." Pena, 869 
P.2d at 938. The Trial Court should be granted broad discretion because of 
the nature of the factual disputes and because the Trial Court was in a better 
4
 Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Zoll's misconduct 
was not the proximate cause of Castleton's claimed damages? 
2 
P"sihnii in r i' i i|iii i ii n|ii ill \\y i yidenr Houghton v. Dept. ol 
Health, 962 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1998). 
Determinative Statutes, Ordinances or Rules 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances or rules 
whose interpretation is believed to be solely determinative of the issues on 
appeal. 
Statement of the Case 
A. Nature of the Case. Contrary to Castleton's assertion, this is 
jse of a lawyer who betrayed his client nor doe f 
the ethical rules established by the Utah Code of Professional Responsibility. 
This is a case of a former client suing his former attorney for malpractice 
based ii| II II i , in ullt '()<'( I I II i MI 11 ol In IIH i,n y duly I hr, i\ «i < rise* oh i i mivirted 
embezzler suing his victim and his former attorney to get back the 
restitution he voluntarily provided. This case centers on the activities of 
$72,000.00 from Nathan Ricks and the NS Group, a then current Zoll & 
Branch client. Castleton, the convicted thief, and his fiancee, Suzanne 
Roderick ("Roderick") concocted a "sham" lawsuit in an effort to extort from 
his victim, Ricks, and his former attorney, Zoll, unsubstantiated damages 
allegedly ' -u l l f i rd 11 >, i dsllelim MUM In wuv. i nn l im i tn l I i , I 'nk tin I nil 
with his embezzlement, Castleton first admitted his wrongdoing and offered 
restitution, and then several months later reversed his position and seeks to 
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blame Zoll, his former attorney, for the fact that he was being held 
accountable for his embezzlement. 
Zoll had previously represented Castleton on three (3) matters. Zoll's 
representation of Castleton ceased when Castleton failed to pay Zoll and Zoll 
terminated the attorney-client relationship. Almost a year after the 
attorney-client relationship between Zoll and Castleton had ended, Zoll and 
Ricks met with Castleton in Zoll's office to confront Castleton with his 
embezzlement from Ricks. Castleton immediately admitted to the 
wrongdoing and agreed to make amends by entering into an agreement to 
make restitution, return Ricks' proprietary information and provide Ricks 
with some collateral to serve as security for his promise to repay the 
$72,000.00 in stolen funds. Following the meeting, Ricks and Castleton 
(without Zoll) went to Castleton's home and Ricks took possession of various 
items of personal property Ricks was led to believe by Castleton belonged to 
him. Castleton was present, agreed to give Ricks the items and even helped 
Ricks load the items into his vehicles. Before leaving Zoll's office, Castleton 
and Ricks had agreed to provide Zoll a list of collateral to be incorporated 
into the agreement. Castleton and Ricks failed to provide the list of items. 
Some ten (10) days after the initial meeting, Castleton met with his fiancee 
Roderick's attorney and executed a document pledging all of the items that 
Ricks' had taken possession of to his fiancee. The next day Castleton 
knowingly and voluntarily executed a written agreement prepared by Zoll to 
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pay back the money and granted a security interest in the same property to 
Ricks. Castleton and his fiancee, Suzanne Roderick, then set up a "sham" 
lawsuit to sue each other as Plaintiff and Defendant to recover the collateral 
given to Ricks as restitution and pledged to Roderick. The lawsuit named 
Ricks and Zoll as co-defendants on the pretext of alleged wrongdoing by Zoll 
and Ricks in holding Castleton to his agreement. Throughout the entire 
case, Castleton and Roderick (as Plaintiff and Defendant) cooperated in the 
filing of joint motions against Zoll and Ricks. At trial, the Court found that 
Castleton and Roderick had secret agreements (drafted by their attorneys) 
relating to the transfer or ownership of certain assets in an attempt to 
enhance their claims for damages against Zoll and Ricks. Whenever they 
thought it necessary Castleton and Roderick would assign the assets from 
one to the other to further that scheme. 
Castleton misstates the true nature of this action. This is a case about 
an admitted thief and his fiancee creating a "sham" lawsuit to get a claimed 
money damage award of $50 to $100 million against an attorney who 
breached no duty owed to Castleton. 
The Trial Court had the opportunity to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses and view the evidence. The Trial Court clearly found (1) that no 
attorney-client relationship existed between Zoll and Castleton at the April 8, 
1996 meeting (Finding No. 25, R. 1758), (2) that no confidential or 
information not generally known was shared with Zoll as a result of his 
5 
previous representations of Castleton (Findings No. 31, R. 1760), and (3) 
that the Post-Divorce Action, the Bankruptcy Action, and the Collection Case 
were not substantially factually related to the matter involving Castleton's 
theft of money from Ricks (Findings No. 29, R. 1759). Finally, (4) the Court 
found that there was no causal link between Zoll's conduct and any damages 
that Castleton claimed to have sustained and that Zoll had nothing to do 
with Ricks' alleged non-consensual taking of the property, the alleged 
damage to the property while in Rick's possession, or the circumstances of 
Ricks failing to return property. Findings No. 34, R. 1760 and Findings No. 
36, R. 1761. Based upon these Findings, the Court properly concluded that 
Zoll did not Breach his Fiduciary Duty to Castleton. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
1. Zoll represented Castleton on three matters: (a) a hearing in 
Castleton's Bankruptcy (the "Bankruptcy Action"), (b) filed an answer in a 
collection case and gave the Court notice of the automatic stay caused by 
Castleton's bankruptcy (the "Collection Case"), and (c) represented 
Castleton in a contempt proceeding and in a petition to modify his divorce 
decree (the "Post-Divorce Action"). Finding Nos. 1, 2, and 3 at R. 1753. 
2. On October 4, 1994, Zoll represented Castleton at a hearing in 
the Post-Divorce Action. Trial Exh. E. At the hearing, the parties stipulated 
to a full resolution of the pending petition to modify the divorce decree. 
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Trial Exh. E. The Stipulation was read into the record of the Court. Trial 
Exh. E. 
3. On January 24, 1995, an order memorializing the stipulation was 
filed with the Court and submitted to Zoll by opposing counsel. Trial Exh. 7. 
4. On February 14, 1995, Zoll filed an objection to the form of the 
order. Trial Exh. 9. The Objection was only to the form of the order that 
memorialized the in court stipulation of the parties and centered on the 
insertion of four (4) phrases. Trial Exh. 9. 
a. In paragraph A, the word "or decrease" was to be added. R. 
1984 at p. 352 line 23 -353 line 3. 
b. In paragraph B, the word "reserved" was to be replaced with 
"dismissed." R. 1984 at p. 353 lines 4-8. 
c. In paragraph D, the phrase "support determined by the court 
at that time" was to be added. R. 1984 at p. 353 lines 19-23. 
d. In paragraph F, the phrase "shall obtain" was to be replaced 
with "has obtained." R. 1984 at p. 353 line 24- 354 line 4. 
5. The Hearing on the objection to the Proposed Order 
memorializing the stipulation was struck by the Court on the Court's on 
motion on April 28, 1995. Trail Exh. 11. The Court further stated in the 
minute entry that there would be a determination whether the matter will be 
ruled upon, or heard by Judge Rokich or by Judge Bohling as Judge Rokich 
was in the process of retiring. Trial Exh. 11. No further action was taken by 
7 
Zoll on the Post-Divorce Action. R. 1985 at p. 648 lines 3-19. Castleton told 
Zoll to drop the objection shortly thereafter. R. 1983 at p. 54 lines 15 -57 
line 10. 
6. Zoll obtained no confidential information from Castleton during 
the scope of their relationship that was not already publicly known in the 
Post-Divorce Action or the Bankruptcy Court files. Finding No. 31 at R. 
1760. 
7. Zoll did not share any information (other than that Zoll had 
previously represented Castleton in a divorce proceeding) with Ricks. R. 
1984 at p. 451 line 15- 452 line 10. 
8. Zoll did not give Ricks any information about Castleton's assets 
or property (even though they were included as a public record in 
Castleton's Bankruptcy schedules and in the files in the Third District Court). 
R. 1984 at p. 476 lines 10-19. 
9. Ricks did not know that Castleton had declared bankruptcy in 
1994 until the bankruptcy was brought up during Trial in 1999. R. 1984 at 
p. 452 lines 2-6. 
10. The Trial Court found that Castleton could not cite to any 
evidence of specific information that Zoll would have obtained in his 
representation of Castleton that was either confidential or that was not 
otherwise generally known. Finding No. 31 at R. 1760. 
8 
11. The Trial Court concluded based upon the evidence and 
credibility of the witnesses that "Zoll received no confidential information 
form Castleton during the Post-Divorce Action, the Bankruptcy Action or the 
Collection Case, which benefited Ricks in the subsequent representation 
against Castleton." Conclusion No. 7 at R. 1762. 
12. No legal services were performed by Zoll on Castleton's 
behalf on any case after February 14, 1995.5 R. 1984 at p. 369 lines 9-19 
and R. 1983 at p. 142 lines 1-8. 
13. On May 24, 1995, a final decree was entered in the 
Bankruptcy Action, the case was closed, and the attorney-client relationship 
between Zoll and Castleton on that matter terminated. Finding No. 2 at R. 
1753, Finding No. 25 at R. 1758, Trial Exh. D. 
14. On June 13, 1995, notice was provided to the Court that 
the Collection Case was stayed by the automatic bankruptcy stay, the case 
removed from tracking, and the attorney-client relationship between Zoll 
5
 Castleton attempted at trial and is attempting in his brief to claim that 
"legal services" were performed on Castleton's behalf on 3/21/96. However, 
that allegation clearly misstates the evidence. The April 1, 1996 billing 
clearly shows that the services were for a "runner fee." Tr. Exh. 27. On 
March 21 , 1996, a runner picked up some books for Joe Rawie and mistakenly 
billed Mr. Castleton $10.00 (one hour of the runner's time) unbeknownst to 
Zoll and totally unrelated to any legal work for Castleton. R. at 1350. Zoll 
Depo at 67, 76-77. The testimony consistently throughout this case and at 
trial was that the fee was mistakenly charged to Castleton's account 
unbeknownst to Zoll and that no legal services were performed on 
Castleton's behalf after February 14, 1995. R. 1983 at p. 142 lines 1-8. 
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and Castleton on that matter terminated. Finding No. 3 at R. 1753, Finding 
No. 25 at R. 1758 and Trial Exh. A.6 
15. On August 2, 1995, Zoll sent a letter to Castleton advising 
Castleton that he was delinquent on his bill, demanding payment and 
stating: 
In any event, if you do not make arrangements with our 
office to begin payment on your bill within two (2) weeks 
from the date hereof, I will have no other option but to 
withdraw as your counsel in the matters that this law 
firm has represented you and to pursue collection of 
this amount from you. . . If you wish to make 
arrangements with our office to begin payment on your legal 
bill, in order to continue to receive my services as your 
attorney, please contact my office immediately. 
Trial Exh. 21 (Emphasis added). 
16. Although Castleton made one payment of $100.00, he did 
not make the required arrangements to pay the bill. Findings No. 5, 6, 7 at 
R. 1754. 
17. The Trial Court found that Castleton did not make 
arrangements to trade printing services in exchange for legal services as 
Castleton claimed. Findings No. 9-105, 6, 7 at R. 1754-55. 
18. The Trial Court found that after considering all the 
evidence and weighing the credibility of the witnesses that the attorney-
client relationship on the Post-Divorce Action ended when Castleton failed to 
6
 It is interesting to note that up to and through the trial Castleton claimed 
that the Collection Case and the Bankruptcy Action were still active as of 
April 8, 1996. R. at 1256. 
10 
comply with the terms of the August 2, 1995 termination letter. Finding No. 
25 at R. 1758 and Conclusion No.2 at R. 1761. 
19. Eight (8) months after the attorney-client relationship 
between Zoll and Castleton terminated for Castleton's failure to make the 
required payments and fourteen (14) months after Zoll ceased performing 
legal services for Castleton, there was a meeting at Zoll's law office 
concerning Castleton's embezzlement from his employer Nathan Ricks 
("Ricks"). Conclusion No. 2 at R. 1761, R. 1984 at p. 369 lines 9-19, and 
Finding No. 11 at R. 1755. 
20. Zoll informed Castleton that the meeting was to discuss his 
employment relationship with Ricks' company the N.S. Group. Finding No. 
l l a t R . 1755. 
21. At the meeting, Zoll again reminded Castleton that he did 
not represent him, but rather that he represented Ricks. Finding No. 12 at 
R. 1755. 
22. At the April 8, 1996 meeting, Zoll did not threaten 
Castleton with criminal prosecution and did not threaten to call the Sheriff 
and have Castleton arrested as Castleton claimed. Finding No. 12 at R. 
1755. 
23. Zoll believed that the attorney-client relationship had 
ended when Castleton failed to comply with the terms of the August 2, 1995 
Letter and based upon Castleton's statements to him regarding the 
l i 
objection. R. 1983 at p. 144 lines 14-17, R. 1983 at p. 141 lines 7-23 Trial 
Exh. C, Finding No. 3 at R. 1753, Finding No. 25 at R. 1758 and Trial Exh. A. 
24. Castleton knew that the attorney-client relationship was 
over before the April 8, 1996 meeting. Trial Exh. G ("Affiant [Castleton] 
believed up until about April 8, 1996, that Defendant B. Ray Zoll represented 
Affiant") and R. 1984 at p. 402 lines 17-20. 
25. Castleton could not have reasonably believed or 
subjectively believed that Zoll was his attorney at the April 8, 1996 meeting 
because he had received written and verbal notice of the termination of the 
relationship. Finding No. 26 and 27 at R. 1759. 
26. The Court found that Zoll was not prohibited from 
representing Ricks against Castleton because Castleton's theft of 
approximately $72,000.00 was not substantially factually related to the 
Post-Divorce Action, the Bankruptcy Action, or the Collection Case. Finding 
No. 29 at R. 1759. 
27. Castleton was not placed at any disadvantage in the 
matter of the theft of money from Ricks by virtue of any alleged confidential 
information acquired by Zoll in his previous representation of Castleton. 
Finding No. 30 at R. 1759. 
28. At the meeting, Castleton suggested that he would be 
willing to give Ricks equipment and property as a trade off for the money 
that he had embezzled. R. 1983 at p. 128 lines 2-20. 
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29. After the meeting, Ricks and Castleton agreed that Ricks 
would follow Castleton to his home and obtain whatever computer hardware 
and software were necessary to preserve NS Group's data which was on 
Castleton's computer, and also to obtain other property to hold as collateral 
for repayment of the embezzled funds. Finding 13 at R. 1755. 
30. Ricks took possession of his data, computer and other 
electronic equipment as security for the debt that Castleton owed Ricks. 
Finding No. 13 at R. 1755. Zoll did not go with Castleton and Ricks to 
Castleton's home. Finding No. 13 at R. 1755. 
31. Zoll did not tell Ricks what to seize and Ricks decided (by 
himself and without any information from Zoll) to seize anything of value. 
R. 1984 at p. 476 lines 10-19 and R. 1985 p. 478 line 21-479 line 1. Zoll 
did not participate in the consensual acquisition of items and allowed 
Castleton and Ricks to work out the property issue which Zoll would later 
incorporate into the April 19, 1996 agreement.7 R. 1983 p. 131 lines 3-7 
and R. 1983 p. 136 lines 2-5. 
32. Zoll had nothing to do with the alleged taking of the 
additional property by Ricks, the damage to the property while in Rick's 
7This is the reason that the April 19, 1996 Agreement did not contain any 
exhibits. Castleton and Ricks were to create an Exhibit A and Exhibit B to 
the Agreement. Castleton and Ricks never did agree on what should be on 
Exhibits A and B and therefore no Exhibits were attached to the Agreement. 
R. 1984 at p. 457 line 16-458 line 24. 
13 
possession, or the circumstances or Ricks failing to return property. Finding 
No. 36 at R. 1761. 
33. Zoll could not have reasonably foreseen that Ricks would 
not return the property that he had agreed to return, or that Ricks would 
damage property in his possession. Finding No. 37 at R. 1761. 
34. Castleton failed to produce any evidence that showed a 
causal link between the conduct of Mr. Zoll and any damages that Castleton 
may have sustained. Finding No. 34 at R. 1760. 
35. On April 9, 1996, Zoll sent Castleton a "Notice of 
Termination" that clearly states that Zoll and Branch were acting as 
attorneys for Nathan Ricks and NS Group. Trial Exh. 25 and Finding No. 15 
at R. 1756. 
36. On April 18, 1996, after meeting with Roderick and her 
attorney Castleton signed the UCC-ls for the same property that Castleton 
had earlier given to Ricks as collateral for the promised restitution on April 8, 
1996. Castleton Depo. at 143 -150. 
37. On April 19, 1996, Castleton went to the offices of Zoll & 
Branch and reviewed, edited by interlineations in his own handwriting and 
signed a settlement agreement memorializing the events of April 8, 1996. 
Finding No. 16 at R. 1756 and Trial Exh. 26. 
38. That settlement agreement states "said property was 
consensually given to Ricks for security purposes and is being held by 
14 
agreement pending execution of this agreement" and "Castleton represents 
that he is not a party to any other agreement which would prevent him from 
entering into this Agreement or which would adversely affect this Agreement 
or the performance of any services hereunder in any manner." Trial Exh. 
26. 
39. Castleton never mentioned to Zoll or Ricks that he had 
signed UCC-ls in favor of his fiancee the day before he executed the 
"Settlement Agreement" or that he could not in good faith execute the 
"Settlement Agreement" under paragraph 11 because of the UCC-ls he 
executed the day before. Zoll Depo at page 147 line 25 to page 148 line 5. 
40. The Court found that Castleton was under no undue duress 
or pressure to sign the agreement. Finding No. 16 at R. 1756 and Trial Exh. 
26. 
41 . Castleton argued to the court in his sentencing hearing 
during the criminal proceeding on the embezzlement that the property given 
to Ricks should be and was used as a set-off towards the money that he 
took from Ricks (even though he was suing Ricks in this case for damages 
for taking the property). Trial Exh. B and R. 1983 at p. 174 lines 8-20. 
42. On July 11, 1996, Roderick (Castleton's fiancee) initiated 
this action and sued Zoll and Ricks claiming that she was the true owner of 
the items Castleton gave to Ricks on April 8, 1996 and that Ricks and Zoll 
converted her personal property, security interest, and destroyed her 
15 
property. R. 1-42. Roderick attached the UCC-ls that Castleton had signed 
(after delivering possession of the property to Ricks) as evidence of her 
ownership of the property. R. 37, 39, and 40. 
43. In August 1999, Ricks, Castleton, and Roderick settled 
their claims against each other and Ricks returned all the items he took from 
Castleton. Trial Exh. Q and R. 1984 at p. 455 lines 15-25. 
44. Castleton claims that he is entitled to damages against Zoll 
for all the items that he gave to Ricks on April 8, 1996 and were not 
returned by Ricks or damaged by Ricks. R. 1985 at p. 463 lines 20-25. 
These items allegedly include compact discs, computer equipment, phones, 
cables, software, laser discs, etc.8 Trial Exh. 29. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I . CASTLETON HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE 
SUFFICIENT TO OVERTURN THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS 
OF FACT. 
Castleton has failed to marshal the evidence required to overturn the 
trial court's findings of fact. Castleton continues to assert only such facts as 
are favorable to him to demonstrate alleged instances of "Zoll's misconduct" 
and ignores all other contrary evidence. The facts Castleton argues are 
clearly contradicted by the weight of the evidence at trial and the Trial 
8
 When Ricks was asked about the property he allegedly took and did not 
return that was listed on Plaintiff's Exhibit 29, Ricks stated "then they were 
never there because we returned everything we had in our possession." R. 
1984 at p. 455 lines 21-25. 
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Court's Findings of Fact. In order for Castleton to establish clear error in the 
Trial Court's findings of fact, he must first marshal all the evidence that 
supports a particular finding of fact by the trial court and then marshal all 
the evidence that shows that the particular fact is clearly erroneous. 
Castleton has failed to marshal the evidence and has simply cited only the 
facts favorable to his position. This failure alone is a fatal defect to 
Castleton's appeal. 
I I . CASTLETON FAILED TO ESTABLISH ANY OF THE ELEMENTS 
OF BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY UNDER KILPATRICK. 
Castleton did not meet his burden at trial to establish an attorney-
client relationship at the April 8, 1996 meeting. The trial court was correctly 
persuaded that Zoll did not breach any duty owed to Castleton, as a former 
client, by representing Ricks in the matter of Castleton's theft of $72,000.00 
because Zoll's prior representation of Castleton was not the same or a 
substantially factually related matter. Moreover, Zoll had not obtained any 
confidential information from Castleton nor shared any confidential 
information (assuming that he obtained some) with Ricks. Finally, Castleton 
was unable to persuade the Trial Court that Zoll's actions were the actual 
and proximate cause of Castleton's damages. Ricks' actions of allegedly 
taking more than Castleton consented to, damaging the property he took, 
and not returning that property were the actual cause of Castleton's 
damages. The Trial Court correctly found and concluded that Zoll had 
nothing to do with those damage claims. Zoll was not aware that Ricks was 
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going to take more property than he originally agreed to nor could Zoll know 
that Ricks would damage or fail to return property. The Trial Court was 
correct in finding that Ricks actions presented an independent intervening 
cause of Castleton's alleged damages. As such the Trial Court correctly 
found that Castleton failed to demonstrate any damage incurred as a 
proximate result of Zoll's actions. 
I I I . ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY DO NOT PER SE ESTABLISH CIVIL 
LIABILITY. 
Even assuming arguendo that this Court were to find that the Trial 
Court's Findings of Fact were clearly erroneous and that Zoll did breach a 
duty owed to Castleton, Zoll still cannot without a further showing of proof 
be held to be subject to civil liability for merely violating the Utah Rules of 
Professional Responsibility. Castleton argues that the rules and principles of 
attorney disqualification govern this case. Castleton reasons that because 
Zoll could not have represented Ricks and Castleton simultaneously 
(assuming that Castleton's attorney-client relationship with Zoll was not 
terminated) that Zoll is therefore, ipso facto, responsible for $50 to $100 
million dollars in unsubstantiated damages. Contrary to case law precedent 
decided by this Court, Castleton argues that Rules 1.7 and 1.9 of the Utah 
Rules of Professional Responsibility provide an independent basis for civil 
liability and bypass the traditional standards of proof. The Utah Rules of 
Professional Responsibility are not a trump card that would allow Castleton 
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to bypass his burden of proving liability, damages, and the causal link 
between them. 
ARGUMENT 
I . CASTLETON HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE 
REQUIRED TO SET ASIDE THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDINGS OF FACT # 1 1 , 12, 16, 25-27, AND 36. 
Castleton has failed to marshal the evidence required to set aside the 
Trial Court's Findings of Fact #11 , 12, 16, 25-27 and 36. Castleton "must 
marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact and 
then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings against an attack." 
State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990). 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) provides: "Findings of fact, whether 
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court 
to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). 
As a prerequisite to an appellant's attack on findings of fact, the 
appellant must marshal all the evidence in support of the findings and 
demonstrate "that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings...." Grayson Roper Ltd. v. 
Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989). The marshaling requirement 
provides the appellate court the basis from which to conduct a meaningful 
and expedient review of facts challenged on appeal. See Wright v. Westside 
Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 512 n. 2 (Utah Ap.1990). 
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Castleton has chosen only to present the facts he considers favorable 
to his position and ignores his duty to marshal all of the facts for this Court. 
Castleton asserts numerous facts in his brief that are clearly contradicted by 
the Trial Court's Findings of Fact and seems to simply assert that because 
the Trial Court did not agree with him it must therefore be wrong. 
For example, Castleton asserts in his brief that Zoll set up an 
"ambush." This claim is contradicted by Finding No. 11 at R. 1755. The 
Court found that 
[b]efore the meeting, Zoll called Castleton and asked him to 
meet with he and Ricks about his employment relationship with 
Ricks' company the N.S. Group. Zoll did not advise Castleton 
that they were going to confront him at the meeting with an 
allegation that he had stolen money from Ricks. 
Finding No. 11 at R. 1755. The Court also found that as of April 8, 1996, 
Castleton knew or reasonably should have known that Zoll had severed the 
relationship and did not represent his interest. Finding No. 25 at R. 1758, 
Finding No. 26 at R. 1759, and Finding No. 27 at 1759. Finally, Castleton 
knew that he was stealing from Ricks and was going to Ricks' attorney's 
office to discuss his employment with Ricks' company. Trial Exh. B and 
Finding No. 11 at R. 1755. These findings are supported by the August 2, 
1995 termination letter, the testimony of Ricks, Zoll, and in many instances 
the testimony of Castleton. R. 1983 at p. 108 lines 1-9, R. 1983 at p. 110 
lines 11-14, Trial Exh. 26, R. 1983 at p. 173 lines 3-20, and R. 1985 at p. 
473-478. 
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Castleton asserts in his brief that Zoll "simultaneously" represented 
Castleton and Ricks at the April 8, 1996 meeting. This claim completely 
ignores Finding No. 25 at R. 1758 ("The Court finds, under all the 
circumstances, that as of the April 1996 meeting, there was no attorney-
client relationship between Zoll and Castleton."), Finding No. 26 at R. 1759 
("The Court finds that neither Zoll nor Castleton subjectively believed at the 
time of the April 1996 meeting that there was an attorney-client relationship 
existing between them."), and Finding No. 27 at R. 1759. ("The Court finds 
that objectively speaking Castleton could not reasonably have any 
expectation that an attorney-client relationship with Zoll at the time of the 
April 1996 meeting and after."). These findings are supported by the 
transcript of the meeting, the settlement agreement, the notice of 
termination, and the credible testimony of Ricks, Zoll, and in many instances 
the testimony of Castleton. Trial Exh. 24, Trial Exh. 26, Trial Exh. 25, R. 
1985 at p. 657 lines 9 - p. 659 line 5. Trial Exh. G, R. 1984 at p. 361 lines 
22-25, R. 1984 at p. 402 - p. 403 line 25. 
Castleton asserts in his brief that Zoll threatened Castleton at the April 
8, 1996 meeting with arrest and criminal sanctions if Castleton did not 
cooperate in the civil action. This claim is clearly contradicted by Finding No. 
12 at R. 1755 ("Zoll advised Castleton at the meeting that his conduct was 
criminal in nature, but the Court finds that Mr. Zoll did not threaten to call 
the Sheriff and have Mr. Castleton arrested, as Castleton claims."). This 
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finding is supported by the tape transcript of the meeting, the credible 
testimony of Ricks, Zoll, and in many instances the testimony of Castleton. 
Trial Exh. 24, R. 1984 at p. 451 lines 10-14, R. 1985 at p. 447 lines 22-25, 
and R. 1985 at p. 478 lines 3-5. 
Castleton asserts in his brief that Zoll "orchestrated" Ricks' consensual 
acquisition of Castleton's property. This claim is clearly contradicted by 
Finding No. 36 at R. 1761 ("There is no evidence whatsoever that Zoll had 
anything to do with the taking of additional property, the damage while in 
Rick's possession, or the circumstance of Ricks failing to return property that 
he had agreed to return."). Castleton erroneously claims that Zoll facilitated 
the efforts of Ricks to seize more property that Castleton had allegedly 
originally agreed to. The Trial Court found "Ricks took possession of the 
data and of substantial computer and other electronic equipment as 
security." Finding No. 13 at R.1756. The Trial Court found that "Zoll did not 
go with Castleton and Ricks to Castleton's home." Finding No. 13 at R.1756. 
The Trial Court found that "[t]here is no evidence whatsoever that Zoll 
had anything to do with taking of additional property, the damage 
while in Rick's possession, or the circumstances of Ricks failing to 
return the property that he had agreed to return." Finding No.36 at 
R.1761 (emphasis added). Finally, the Trial Court found that "it was not 
foreseeable to Zoll that Ricks would not return property that he had agreed 
to return, or that Ricks would damage property in his possession." Finding 
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No.37 at R.1761. These findings are clearly supported by the credible 
testimony of Ricks, Zoll, and in many instance the testimony of Castleton. 
R. 1985 at p. 476 line 4 - p. 479 line 1, R. 1983 at p. 186 lines 8-14, R. 
1983 at p. 135 line 25 - p. 136 line 5. 
Castleton asserts in his brief that Zoll pressured or exerted undue 
influence on Castleton to force him into signing an agreement that 
acknowledges that the taking of property by Ricks was "consensual." This 
claim is clearly contradicted by Finding No. 16 at R. 1756 ("The Court finds 
that the agreement was entered into by Castleton, knowingly and 
voluntarily, and that he was under no undue duress or pressure to sign the 
agreement."). The record clearly states that the agreement memorializing 
the events of April 8, 1996 was executed eleven (11) days later and after 
Castleton had been to a different attorney's office and executed a conflicting 
document the day before at his fiancee's request. R. 1985 at p. 697 and R. 
1988 at p. 143-150, and Finding No. 16 at 1756. 
Castleton asserts in his brief that his $100 payment met the 
requirements of the August 2, 1995 Termination Letter and that he later 
made arrangements to pay his bill by giving printed materials to Mr. Rawle. 
This claim is clearly contradicted by Finding No. 25 at R. 1758 ("The Court 
finds, under all the circumstances, that as of the April 1996 meeting, there 
was no attorney-client relationship between Zoll and Castleton.") and 
Finding No. 10 at R. 1755 ("The Court finds that no such agreement was 
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made, and that no materials as testified by Castleton were delivered to Mr. 
Rawle for delivery to Mr. Zoll in payment of his legal bill."). These findings 
are clearly supported by the stipulated testimony of Joe Rawle and Janeal 
Lindeman and the credible testimony of Zoll, and in many instances the 
testimony of Castleton. R. 1983 at p. 141 lines 7-13, R. 1984 at p. 372 line 
4 - p. 387 line 3, R. 1985 at p. 664 lines 5-24, R. 1984 at p. 382 line 23 -
p. 383 line 19. 
Castleton did not point out that the Trial Court viewed the lawsuit 
between Castleton and Roderick as a "sham" and found that Roderick and 
Castleton joined forces to bolster claims against Zoll. Finding No. 22 at R. 
1758. The evidence showed that Castleton never answered Roderick's' 
complaint and Roderick failed to pursue any claim against Castleton until a 
Default Certificate was entered by Roderick against Castleton on September 
13, 1999 (more than three (3) years after the complaint was filed). R. 
1690-1691. Castleton failed to mention that the evidence also showed that 
Castleton and Roderick were engaged to be married and lived together 
during the pendency of the action while acting as Plaintiff and Defendant. R. 
1983 at p. 150 lines 3-14. 
Castleton failed to state that the Default Judgment (entered against 
Zoll for Zoll's alleged failure to comply with discovery requests) was set 
aside because Zoll had in fact responded to the discovery requests. R.769-
770 and R. 1126-1129. Moreover, the Court set aside the Judgment 
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because Roderick and Castleton failed to follow Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration Rule 4-504 and submitted the "Order Granting Joint Motion" 
for Default Judgment against Zoll without first submitting it to Zoll to 
approve as to form.9 R.1020-1055. The Court found Zoll had responded to 
the discovery requests but ordered Zoll to pay Castleton's attorney's fees 
reasonably incurred after July 6, 1998 for his failure to state that the 
exhibits sought by the requested document did not exist.10 R. 1088, 1193-
1196. 
Castleton failed to point out that during the pendency of the lawsuit 
Roderick and Castleton (as Plaintiff and Defendant) effectuated at least five 
(5) transfers of the assets between them that served as the basis for 
Castleton's damage claims. R. 1985 at p. 409-415. These transfers 
occurred at various times throughout the litigation when it seemed to suit 
needs of either Roderick or Castleton to bolster either Castleton or 
Roderick's damages claims.11 Finding No. 22, R. 1758. 
9
 Note that there is no space for Zoll or Ricks to approve as to form on the 
"Order Granting Joint Motion." R. 896. 
10
 July 6, 1998 was the date of a letter specifically requesting the non-
existing exhibits to the document. R. 849. In response to that letter, 
Counsel for Zoll provided another copy of the document without exhibits to 
Castleton rather that affirmatively state that no exhibits existed. R. 919 and 
R. 1893 at p. 136 line 14-23. 
11
 For example, when the Default Judgment was entered against Zoll, the 
assets where transferred to Roderick to bolster her claims of damages. After 
the default was set aside and Roderick's claims against Zoll dismissed by 
Summary Judgment, Roderick transferred the assets to Castleton to enhance 
his damages. 
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Castleton failed to state that, Castleton argued to the court in the 
criminal proceeding at his sentencing hearing that the materials 
consensually acquired by Ricks constituted restitution or were at least a set-
off towards the money that he took from Ricks (even though he was 
currently suing Ricks for damages based upon his taking of that property). 
Trial Exh. B and R. 1983 at p. 174 lines 8-20. 
If Castleton wished to overturn these findings, Castleton must first 
show what evidence was available to the Court and that the Trial Court's 
findings were clearly erroneous. To prove that the trial court's findings of 
fact were clearly erroneous, "an appellant must marshal all evidence in favor 
of the facts as found by the trial court and then demonstrate that even 
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the court below, the 
evidence is insufficient to support the findings of fact." Saunders v. Sharp, 
806 P.2d 198, 199-200 (Utah 1991). Castleton has not done this. 
If an appellant fails to marshal the evidence, "the appellate court 
assumes that the record supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds 
to a review of the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and the 
application of that law in the case." Id. at 199. Castleton has failed to 
marshal the evidence required to find that the Trial Court's findings of fact 
are clearly erroneous. Because Castleton has failed to marshal the evidence 
in regards to any of the Trial Court's Findings of Facts, this Court must 
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assume the record supports the findings of the trial court and not allow 
Castleton to argue facts in this appeal not found by the Trial Court. 
I I . CASTLETON FAILED TO ESTABLISH ANY OF THE ELEMENTS 
OF BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY UNDER KILPATRICK. 
Castleton did not establish any of the elements of breach of fiduciary 
duty under Kilpatrick v. Wilev. Rein & Fielding. 909 P.2d 1283, 1290 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996). Castleton argues that he does not have to prove actual or 
proximate cause and that this Court can simply assume an attorney-client 
relationship, assume confidential information was exchanged and violated, 
and thereafter assume that damages occurred. However, that misstates the 
standard of the law for legal malpractice based on breach of fiduciary duty. 
The essential elements of legal malpractice based on breach of 
fiduciary duty include the following: (1) an attorney-client 
relationship; (2) breach of the attorney's fiduciary duty to the 
client; (3) causation, both actual and proximate; and (4) 
damages suffered by the client. 
Kilpatrick v. Wilev. Rein & Fielding 909 P.2d 1283, 1290 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996). 
Castleton argues that the Kilpatrick case is not the controlling 
authority in this case and asserts that this Court should instead apply Von 
Hake v. Thomas. 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985), Baker v. Pattee. 684 P.2d 632 
(Utah 1984) and Wheeler bv and through Wheeler v. Mann. 763 P.2d 758 
(Utah 1988). This position is incorrect because (1) Kilpatrick clearly sets the 
standard for the alleged malpractice of an attorney based upon a breach of 
fiduciary duty, and (2) Von Hake. Baker and Wheeler all deal with "self 
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dealing" by a fiduciary and each case presents distinguishable factual 
situations from this case. 
First, Kilpatrick is squarely on point. In Kilpatrick, the Utah Court of 
Appeals reviewed the case law on legal malpractice actions in Utah and 
concluded, "Utah law therefore recognizes legal malpractice actions based on 
breach of fiduciary duty." Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d at 1289. The Court of 
Appeals then sets forth the four (4) essential elements of legal malpractice 
based on breach of fiduciary duty. Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d at 1289. Clearly, 
this case involves an allegation of legal malpractice against an attorney 
based upon an alleged breach of fiduciary duty. R. 1983 at p. 5 lines 19-23. 
The Trial Court in this case correctly applied the standards set forth in 
Kilpatrick. 
Second, the Trial Court was correct in using the standards set forth in 
Kilpatrick because Von Hake, Baker and Wheeler are all significantly factually 
distinguishable from the issues that were before the Trial Court. Von Hake 
dealt with a man, Ed Thomas, who convinced (through alleged undue 
influence) an 82-year-old Von Hake to deed to Thomas his property.12 In 
Baker, the personal representative of grantor's estate brought an action to 
12The Von Hake Court found that Thomas did not breach any fiduciary duty 
to Von Hake because no confidential relationship between Thomas and Von 
Hake existed. The Court did find that Thomas defrauded Thomas. It is 
interesting to note that even though Thomas' attorney, Ronald C. Barker, 
"orchestrated" the transfer by preparing the deed and urged Von Hake to 
sign the deed without assistance of counsel that the cause of action was 
brought against only against Thomas and not Barker, the attorney. Von 
Hake, 705 P.2d at 768. 
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cancel warranty deed from Baker to Pattee based upon undue influence. In 
Wheeler, a trustee was sued for investing trust assets in his own companies. 
Von Hake. Baker, and Wheeler, all deal with "self dealing" by a fiduciary. 
These cases simply do not apply to the instant action. First, the Trial Court 
found after receiving and weighing all of the evidence that no undue 
influence or pressure was placed upon Castleton to sign the April 19, 1996 
Settlement Agreement. Finding No. 16 at R. 1756. Second, the Trial Court 
found that no attorney-client relationship existed between Castleton and Zoll 
at the April 8, 1996 meeting or thereafter. Finding No. 25 at R. 1758. 
Third, there is no "self dealing" in the April 19, 1996 Settlement Agreement 
because Ricks was the beneficiary of that Agreement. Zoll was not self-
dealing as a fiduciary and Zoll would have received payment from Ricks for 
his legal services (charged by the hour) regardless of whether Castleton 
signed the April 19, 1996 Settlement Agreement or not. As such, Kilpatrick 
sets forth the correct legal standard for this case and the trial court correctly 
applied that standard. 
A. THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWED 
THAT THERE WAS NO ATTORNEY-CLIENT 
RELATIONSHIP AT THE APRIL 8, 1996 MEETING. 
In order for Castleton to prove that Zoll had breached his fiduciary 
duty Castleton would need to prove the existence of a current express 
attorney-client relationship between Zoll and Castleton contemporaneous 
with the attorney-client relationship with Ricks on the same or a 
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substantially factually related matter, or the Court must imply the existence 
of an attorney-client relationship because Castleton provided confidential 
information to Zoll which confidence Zoll thereafter breached. Castleton 
could prove neither at trial. 
Castleton did not establish that an attorney-client relationship existed 
at the April 8, 1996 meeting. The Trial Court found that after considering all 
the evidence and weighing the credibility of the witnesses that there was no 
attorney-client relationship on April 8, 1996 and concluded that attorney-
client relationship ended when Castleton failed to comply with the terms of 
the August 2, 1995 termination letter. Finding No. 25 at R. 1758 and 
Conclusion No.2 at R. 1761. 
Moreover, the Trial Court found that "neither Zoll nor Castleton 
subjectively believed at the time of the April 1996 meeting that there was an 
attorney-client relationship existing between them." Finding No. 26 at R. 
1759. The Trial Court also found that "objectively speaking that Castleton 
could not reasonably have any expectation that an attorney-client 
relationship with Zoll at the time of the April 1996 meeting and after." 
Finding No. 27 at R. 1759. 
These findings involved numerous factual disputes that required the 
Trial Court to carefully consider the evidence and weigh the testimony of 
many witnesses. "Where courts are called upon to resolve numerous factual 
disputes, and the quantity of less-tangible factors implicating the trial court's 
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decision is large, a trial court is naturally in a better position to consider and 
weigh all those circumstances in their application to the legal standard at 
issue. Houghton v. Dept. of Health, 962 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1998)(citations 
omitted). Accordingly, considerable discretion should be give to the Trial 
Court's Findings of Fact. 
Pursuant to the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.16, an 
attorney may withdraw from representation of a client for nonpayment of 
fees if the client has been given adequate warning. Utah R. Professional 
Conduct 1.16(b)(4). Zoll ceased performing legal services for Castleton on 
February 14, 1995 almost fourteen (14) months prior to the April 8, 1996 
meeting. Eight months prior to the April 8, 1996 meeting, Castleton 
received Zoll's August 2, 1995 letter placing Castleton on notice of Zoll's 
intent to withdraw if payment in full or a payment schedule satisfactory to 
Zoll was not made and followed. Trial Exh. 21. Castleton failed to make 
payment in full or failed to make and keep current a payment arrangement. 
The evidence showed that Castleton made no arrangements or consistent 
payments (other than a single $100.00 payment in September 1995). 
Castleton claims he made an arrangement between himself, Joseph Rawle 
and the Zoll & Branch Secretary, Janeal Lindeman, whereby Zoll would 
accept trade with Rawle for goods and/or services Castleton provided to 
Rawle. Zoll, Rawle, and Lindeman all disputed any such an arrangement 
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and the Trial Court found from contradicting testimony that no arrangements 
were ever made. Finding No. 10 at 1755. 
Castleton argues that because no formal "Notice of Withdrawal" was 
filed in the Post-Divorce case at the time of the April 8, 1996 meeting that 
Zoll was therefore still representing Castleton.13 This evidence was 
presented at trial and the Trial Court found that "under all the 
circumstances, that as of the April 1996 meeting, there was no attorney-
client relationship between Zoll and Castleton." Finding No. 25 at R. 1758. 
Zoll had not performed any work for Castleton since February 14, 1995. R. 
1983 at p. 142 lines 1-8 and R. 1984 at p. 369 lines 9-19. Castleton did not 
comply with the terms of the August 2, 1995 termination letter. Finding 
Nos. 5, 6, and 7 at R. 1754 and Finding No. 10 at R. 1755. Zoll and 
Castleton knew at the April 8, 1996 meeting that the attorney-client 
relationship was over. Finding No. 25 at R. 1758, Finding 26 at R. 1758, and 
Finding No. 27 at R. 1759. The fact that Zoll did not file a formal "Notice of 
Withdrawal" did not alter the Court's factual finding that Zoll terminated the 
attorney-client relationship with Castleton when he failed to comply with the 
terms of the August 2, 1995 termination letter. See Barry v. Ashley 
Anderson, P.C., 718 F. Sup. 1492, 1494 (D. Colorado 1989)(finding 
attorney-client relationship ended before attorney formally withdrew from 
,3Zoll filed a formal "Notice of Withdrawal" on November 22, 1996 in 
response to receiving a "Re-Notice of Hearing" on the objection to the form 
of the order filed by Mrs. Castleton's attorney in the Post-Divorce Action. 
Trial Exh. C. 
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representation in pending matter). See Also Ganser v. Corder, 980 P.2d 
1032, 1035 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999)(findinc attorney-client relationship ended a 
month before attorney formally withdrew based upon conduct of the 
parties). 
Whether an attorney-client relationship exists for any specific purpose 
can depend on the circumstances and may be a question of fact. See Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure Scope. On February 13, 1995, Zoll filed an 
objection to the form of a Proposed Order. The Objection was only to the 
form of an order which memorialized an in-court stipulation and centered on 
the insertion of four (4) phrases. In paragraph A, the word "or decrease" 
was to be added. R. 1984 at p. 352 line 23 -353 line 3. In paragraph B, 
the word "reserved" was to be replaced with "dismissed." R. 1984 at p. 353 
lines 4-8. In paragraph D, the phrase "support determined by the court at 
that time" was to be added. R. 1984 at p. 353 lines 19-23. In paragraph F, 
the phrase "shall obtain" was to be replaced with "has obtained." R. 1984 at 
p. 353 line 24- 354 line 4. Those four phrases "or decrease," "dismissed", 
"support determined by the court at that time'" and "has obtained" were the 
only questions before the Court. More importantly, the parties had entirely 
resolved the substantive issues by a stipulation that was read into the record 
before the Court on October 4, 1994. Trial Exh. E. The Hearing on the 
objection to the Proposed Order was struck by the Court on the Court's on 
motion on April 28, 1995. The Court further stated in the minute entry that 
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there would be a determination whether the matter will be ruled upon, 
or heard by Judge Rokich or by Judge Bohling as Judge Rokich was in the 
process of retiring. Trial Exh. 11 (emphasis added). Moreover, Castleton 
told Zoll that he should not continue with the objection. R. 1983 at p. 54 
lines 15 -57 line 10. Based upon the Court's striking of the hearing, Minute 
Entry and Castleton's statements to Zoll, Zoll reasonably believed that his 
representation of Castleton on the Post-Divorce case effectively terminated 
when Castleton failed to comply with the terms of the August 2, 1995 
Termination Letter. Finding No. 26 at R. 1759 R. 1983 at p. 144 lines 14-17 
and R. 1983 at p. 141 lines 7-23. Based upon, Castleton's failure to comply 
with the terms of the August 2, 1995 letter and Zoll's written and oral notice 
to Castleton, Castleton knew or should have known that his attorney-client 
relationship with Zoll had terminated. Trial Exh. G ("Affiant [Castleton] 
believed up until about April 8, 1996, that Defendant B. Ray Zoll represented 
Affiant"), R. 1984 at p. 402 lines 17-20, Findings No. 5, 6, 7 at R. 1754, 
Findings No. 9-105, 6, 7 at R. 1754-55, Finding No. 25 at R. 1758, Finding 
No. 26 at R. 1759, and Finding No. 27 at R. 1759. Castleton later acting pro 
se14 withdrew the objection to the form of the order and allowed the order to 
be entered as originally written and submitted. 
14
 I t is interesting to note that Castleton did not obtain another attorney to 
represent him at the hearing on the objections to the form of the order even 
though Castleton now claims that the objections to the form of the order 
were of extreme importance and that Zoll was still representing him. 
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The Trial Court appropriately concluded that the attorney-client 
relationship between Zoll and Castleton was effectively over in August of 
1995 when Zoll gave Castleton the required notice that he intended to 
withdraw under Rule 1.16. The fact that Zoll failed to perform the formal 
albeit perfunctory task of filing a Notice of Withdrawal does not change the 
fact that Castleton was on notice that Zoll was no longer representing him as 
of August 2, 1995. See Riqqs Natl. Bank of Washington, D.C. v. Calumet-
qussin No. l . 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16475 (D.D.C.)(no current 
representation despite fact that firm did minor work for client after suing it). 
Zoll performed no legal work for Castleton after February 14, 1995. R. 
1984 at p. 369 lines 9-19 and R. 1983 at p. 142 lines 1-8. The fact that 
Castleton failed to obtain another attorney on the objection and then later 
withdrew the objection pro se further supports the conclusion that the 
divorce case was essentially over and the objection was moot. 
The evidence clearly demonstrated that no reasonable person could 
have believed that an attorney-client relationship existed between Zoll and 
Castleton on April 8, 1996. Finding No. 27 at R. 1759. In order to 
determine if an attorney-client relationship existed, the Court must view the 
relationships as the client did at the time. Matter of Petrie, 742 P.2d 796, 
801 (Ariz. 1987)("An important factor in evaluating the relationship is 
whether the client thought an attorney-client relationship existed.") While 
Castleton's subjective belief is important, w[h]owever, a party's belief that an 
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attorney-client relationship exists, unless reasonably induced by 
representations or conduct of the attorney, is not sufficient to create a 
confidential attorney-client relationship." Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 
799 P.2d 716 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(emphasis added). Under Utah law, 
Castleton's belief must be reasonable and must be reasonably induced by 
the representations' and conduct of Zoll. The Trial Court found that Zoll 
effectively communicated his withdrawal to Castleton by his statement that 
absent payments he was terminating his attorney-client relationship with 
Castleton. The Trial Court found that everything Zoll did after the August 2, 
1995 Termination Letter was consistent with that statement. Castleton's 
own conduct left no question that he did not meet the terms specified in the 
August 2, 1995 termination letter in order to have Zoll continue as his 
attorney. Castleton failed to comply with the terms of the August 2, 1995 
termination letter. 
At the April 8, 1996 meeting, Zoll specifically stated that he was 
representing Ricks and not Castleton. The Trial Court found that Castleton 
could not reasonably conclude from the events of that meeting that 
Castleton was being represented by Zoll at the meeting or afterwards. On 
April 9, 1996, Zoll sent Castleton a "Notice of Termination" letter that clearly 
stated that Zoll was representing Ricks. "The attorney-client relationship is 
an ongoing relationship giving rise to a continuing duty to the client unless 
and until the client clearly understands, or reasonably should 
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understand, that the relationship is no longer to be depended on." In re 
Weiner, 120 Ariz. 349, 352, 586 P.2d 194, 197 (1978)(emphasis added). 
The Trial Court correctly found that Castleton knew or should have known 
after the August 2, 1995 letter and certainly as of the April 8, 1996 meeting 
that no attorney-client relationship existed between Zoll and Castleton. 
B. ZOLL COMMITTED NO BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
TO CASTLETON BECAUSE THE THEFT OF MONEY 
FROM RICKS WAS NOT SUBSTANTIALLY FACTUALLY 
RELATED TO THE PREVIOUS REPRESENTATIONS AND 
BECAUSE ZOLL OBTAINED NO CONFIDENTIAL 
INFORMATION FROM CASTLETON THAT HE 
DIVULGED TO RICKS. 
Zoll did not breach any duty to Castleton, as a former client, by 
representing Ricks in the matter of Castleton's theft of $72,000.00. Zoll did 
not obtain nor share with Ricks any information from Castleton that was 
confidential. Castleton claims that Zoll violated Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 1.9 by representing Ricks against him in his theft of $72,000.00. 
Assuming arguendo, that the matters are substantially factually related, 
Castleton is not entitled to civil damages against Zoll based solely upon a 
violation of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 1.9. "Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct are not designed to create a basis for civil liability." 
Archuleta v. Hughes, 969 P.2d 409, 413 (Utah 1998). 
Moreover, the Trial Court reviewed and weighed the evidence 
regarding the scope and depth of the Post-Divorce Case, the Collection Case, 
and the Bankruptcy Action and found that those three cases were not 
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substantially factually related to the case involving Castleton's theft of 
$72,000.00 from Ricks. Finding No. 29 at R. 1759. Castleton failed to make 
any plausible argument how he was placed at a disadvantage in the matter 
of theft of money from Ricks by any confidential information Zoll could have 
obtained in his previous representations of Castleton. Finding No. 30 at R. 
1759. 
Furthermore, the Trial Court found that Castleton did not give Zoll any 
confidential information that was not already publicly available in the court 
files of the Post-Divorce Action or the Bankruptcy Action. Finding No. 31 at 
R. 1760. Moreover, Zoll did not share any information (other than that Zoll 
had previously represented Castleton in a divorce proceeding) with Ricks. R. 
1984 at p. 451 line 15- 452 line 10. Zoll did not give Ricks any information 
about Castleton's assets or property (even though they were all included on 
Castleton's Bankruptcy schedules and were also on file in the Third District 
Court). R. 1984 at p. 476 lines 10-19. Ricks did not even know that 
Castleton had declared bankruptcy in 1994 until the bankruptcy was brought 
up during Trial in 1999. R. 1984 at p. 452 lines 2-6. Castleton alleges that 
he need not prove that any confidential information was exchanged but this 
Court can merely assume (without any showing or proof) that it was 
exchanged and assume that Zoll disclosed it. "However, a party must 
show that (1) it submitted confidential information to a lawyer and 
(2) it did so with the reasonable belief that the lawyer was acting as the 
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party's attorney." Cole v. Ruidoso Mun. Schools, 43 F.3d 1373, 1384 (10th 
Cir. 1994)(emphasis added)(finding submission of information and 
reasonable belief that lawyer was acting as the party's attorney required to 
subject the lawyer to the ethical obligation of preserving confidential 
communications). 
Finally, every one of Castleton's allegations of Zoll's alleged 
misconduct is clearly contradicted by the Trial Court's Findings of Fact. 
Because Castleton has failed to marshal the evidence required to overturn 
the Trial Court's findings of Fact as clearly erroneous, this Court "assumes 
that the record supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a 
review of the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and the 
application of that law in the case." Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 
(Utah 1991). Castleton is arguing only his version of the facts that clearly 
were not found by Trial Court. Castleton has made no effort to marshal the 
facts. Castleton claims simply that Zoll "simultaneously" represented 
Castleton and Ricks at the April 8, 1996 meeting. This claim is clearly 
contradicted by Finding No. 25 at R. 1758 ("The Court finds, under all the 
circumstances, that as of the April 1996 meeting, there was no attorney-
client relationship between Zoll and Castleton."), Finding No. 26 at R. 1759 
("The Court finds that neither Zoll nor Castleton subjectively believed at the 
time of the April 1996 meeting that there was an attorney-client relationship 
existing between them."), and Finding No. 27 at R. 1759. ("The Court finds 
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that objectively speaking Castleton could not reasonably have any 
expectation that an attorney-client relationship with Zoll at the time of the 
April 1996 meeting and after.") Castleton claims that Zoll threatened 
Castleton at the April 8, 1996 meeting with arrest and criminal sanctions if 
Castleton did not cooperate in the civil action. This claim is clearly 
contradicted by Finding No. 12 at R. 1755 ("Zoll advised Castleton at the 
meeting that his conduct was criminal in nature, but the Court finds that Mr. 
Zoll did not threaten to call the Sheriff and have Mr. Castleton arrested, as 
Castleton claims."). Castleton claims that Zoll "orchestrated" Ricks' 
consensual acquisition of Castleton's property. This claim is clearly 
contradicted by Finding No. 36 at R. 1761 ("There is no evidence whatsoever 
that Zoll had anything to do with the taking of additional property, the 
damage while in Rick's possession, or the circumstance of Ricks failing to 
return property that he had agreed to return."). Castleton claims that Zoll 
pressured Castleton into signing an agreement that acknowledges that the 
consensual acquisition was "consensual." This claim is clearly contradicted 
by Finding No. 16 at R. 1756 ("The Court finds that the agreement was 
entered into by Castleton, knowingly and voluntarily, and that he was under 
no undue duress or pressure to sign the agreement."). Accordingly, the trial 
court properly concluded based upon the findings that Zoll did not breach 
any fiduciary duty owed to Castleton. 
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C. ZOLL WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE AND ACTUAL CAUSE 
OF CASTLETON'S ALLEGED DAMAGES. 
Zoll's actions were not the actual and proximate cause of Castleton's 
damages. Ricks actions of allegedly seizing more than was consented too, 
damaging property, and not returning property were the actual cause of 
Castleton's damages. Zoll was not aware that Ricks was going to allegedly 
acquire more than he originally agreed to or that he would damage or fail to 
return property under a subsequent agreement with Castleton. Ricks actions 
are an independent intervening cause that prevents Castleton from seeking 
damages against Zoll. "To prevail in legal malpractice actions, clients must 
establish actual cause—that but for the attorney's wrong their loss would not 
have occurred—and proximate cause—that a reasonable likelihood exists that 
they would have ultimately benefited." Kilpatrick v. Wilev, Rein & Fielding 
909 P.2d 1283, 1291 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Regardless of whether or not 
Zoll's actions at the meeting on April 8, 1996 constitute a breach of duty, 
Castleton cannot establish any actual causal relationship to any allegedly 
suffered loss. It is undisputed that the person who acted to take Castleton's 
and or Roderick's property was Ricks and not Zoll. It is also undisputed that 
Zoll never had possession of any of the items and was not even aware of 
what Ricks had taken. Moreover, the evidence showed that Ricks either 
returned the items taken or is under an executory contract to do so by virtue 
of his settlement with Castleton on the eve of trial. There is, therefore, no 
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causal link between Rick's actions (i.e. Castleton's damages) and Zoll's 
conduct. 
Castleton cannot show that any reasonable likelihood exists that he 
would have been treated differently had Zoll not breached the alleged duty. 
Castleton "must show that if the attorney had adhered to the ordinary 
standards of professional conduct and had not breached fiduciary duties, the 
client would have benefited." Kilpatrick v. Wilev, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 
1283, 1291 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). In the instant matter, the actions of Ricks 
were totally independent of Zoll's actions or inactions and were not caused 
by them. Regardless of who represented Ricks on April 8, 1996, Ricks did 
what he did thereafter of his own accord and without Zoll's knowledge or 
involvement. 
D. CASTLETON SUFFERED NO DAMAGES AS A RESULT 
OF ZOLL'S ACTIONS. 
Castleton failed to demonstrate any damages because of Zoll's actions. 
Castleton has already settled his claims with Ricks who was the actual and 
proximate cause of the damages. Under the recent settlement agreement 
between Ricks, Roderick, and Castleton, the parties agreed that Ricks either 
had returned all property taken or would do so. Moreover, the pleadings 
indicate that many, if not all, the items consensually acquired that night 
belonged to Roderick and not Castleton. Roderick claims in her September 
25, 1998 affidavit to be the owner of virtually all the property to be claimed 
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as damages. R. at 957-960. Roderick's claims have been dismissed by this 
Court as not valid against Zoll and Roderick did not appeal that Order. 
Castleton must provide proof with "sufficient certainty that reasonable 
minds might believe from a preponderance of the evidence that the damages 
were actually suffered." First Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feedyards, 
Inc., 653 P.2d 591, 596 (Utah 1982). Castleton cannot show that Zoll 
caused him any damage because there is no definitive proof that Ricks took 
equipment that belonged to Castleton as opposed to property belonging to 
Roderick. Roderick's subsequent transfer of her interest in all the property 
consensually acquired by Ricks cannot be used to bolster Castleton's damage 
claims against Zoll. Moreover, Ricks has already returned or is returning to 
Roderick all the items consensually acquired from Castleton's Apartment on 
April 8, 1996 as part of the recent settlement agreement. Any damages 
done by Ricks are certainly not attributable to Zoll. 
I I I . ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY DO NOT ESTABLISH CIVIL LIABILITY. 
Even if this Court were to find that the Trial Court's Findings of Fact 
were clearly erroneous without being marshaled, Zoll cannot be subject to 
civil liability for simply violating (assuming arguendo that Zoll did) the Utah 
Rules of Professional Responsibility. Castleton argues that the rules and 
principals of disqualification govern this case and that because Zoll could not 
have represented Ricks and Castleton (assuming that the attorney-client 
relationship with Castleton was not terminated on April 8, 1996) at the same 
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time that Zoll is therefore responsible for $50 to $100 million dollars in 
unsubstantiated damages. 
Castleton argues that Rule 1.9 of the Utah Rules of Professional 
Responsibility in and of itself provides a basis for civil liability. The Utah 
Rules of Professional Responsibility do not create standards for imposing civil 
liability. Archuleta v. Hughes. 969 P.2d 409 (Utah 19981. Alternatively, 
Castleton claims that Zoll breached his duty to Castleton is based on Utah 
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7 "Conflicts of Interest: General Rule." 
This is an administrative rule to be enforced solely by the Bar and under 
Utah law no civil remedy is created thereby. Castleton claims that Zoll 
breached his Fiduciary Duty by representing both Castleton and Ricks at the 
April 8, 1996 meeting and afterwards. The basis for that claim is Rule 1.7 of 
the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. It is significant that Castleton offers 
no other authority under common law or case precedent for the creation of 
such a duty. Rule 1.7 states "a lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation of that client will be directly adverse to another client." In 
the absence of Rule 1.7 there is no common law duty being breached by an 
attorney representing two different parties in the same action at the same 
time. In this case, Castleton's only claim is that Zoll breached his fiduciary 
duty to Castleton by failing to follow Rule 1.7. The Rules of Professional 
Conduct are not to be used as a basis for civil liability and Zoll cannot be 
held civilly liable for alleged breaches of those rules. 
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CONCLUSION 
Castleton has failed to marshal the evidence required to overturn the 
trial court's findings of fact. This, in and of itself, is fatal to his appeal. 
Castleton continues to promote to the Court only facts favorable to his 
position in an effort to convince the Court that Zoll is guilty of misconduct. 
The alleged instances of "Zoll's misconduct" were clearly contradicted by the 
weight of the evidence and the Trial Court's Findings of Fact. For Castleton 
to persuade this Court to stray from the Trial Court's findings of fact, he 
must first marshal all the evidence in support of that fact and then marshal 
all the evidence that allegedly disputes that fact and show that the particular 
finding by the Trial Court is clearly erroneous. Castleton has failed to do so 
and has simply made unsupported and unsubstantiated statements 
favorable to his position. Castleton's appeal must be denied on that basis 
alone. 
Under Kilpatrick, Castleton failed to establish any of the elements of 
breach of fiduciary duty. Castleton did not establish an attorney-client 
relationship at the April 8, 1996 meeting. Castleton did not establish an 
implied attorney-client relationship at the April 8, 1996 meeting because Zoll 
was not his attorney at that meeting eii er objectively or subjectively. Zoll 
did not breach any duty owed to Castleton, as a former client, by 
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representing Ricks in the matter of Castleton's theft of $72,000.00. Zoll did 
not obtain any information from Castleton that was confidential. Zoll did not 
divulge any information to Ricks regarding his prior representation of 
Castleton other than the fact that he had represented Castleton in a divorce 
proceeding. Moreover, Zoll's actions were not the actual and proximate 
cause of Castleton's damages. Ricks actions of allegedly seizing more than 
was consented too, damaging property, and not returning property that he 
was required to were the actual cause of Castleton's damages. Zoll has not 
aware that Ricks was going to seize more than he originally agreed to or that 
he would damage or fail to return property. Ricks actions present an 
independent intervening cause that prevents Castleton from seeking 
damages against Zoll. Finally, Castleton failed to demonstrate any damages 
because of Zoll's actions. Castleton has already settled his claims with Ricks 
who was the actual and proximate cause of the damages. 
Even if this Court were to find that the Trial Court's Findings of Fact 
were clearly erroneous, Zoll cannot be subject to civil liability for violating 
(assuming arguendo that he did) the Utah Rules of Professional 
Responsibility. Castleton argues that the rules and principals of 
disqualification govern this case and that because Zoll could not have 
represented Ricks and Castleton (assuming that Castleton's relationship was 
not terminated) at the same time, therefore somehow Zoll is responsible for 
$50 to $100 million dollars in unsubstantiated damages. The Utah Rules of 
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Professional Responsibility do not create any such standards for imposing 
civil liability. 
Castleton argues that this Court should assume that an attorney-
client relationship existed because Zoll failed to perform a formal perfunctory 
duty of filing a "Notice of Withdrawal" even after Zoll gave notice (both 
verbally and in writing) to Castleton that he was no longer his attorney and a 
year had pasted since Zoll preformed any legal work for Castleton. Based 
upon that assumption, Castleton argues that this Court can then assume 
that he gave Zoll confidential information. Castleton wants this Court to 
further assume that Zoll misused the confidential information and wants 
this Court to finally assume damages based upon that misuse without any 
proof. This is not how the standards and burdens of proof are applied. 
Castleton cannot prevail based solely on assumptions. 
Both Zoll and Castleton knew that their attorney-client relationship 
was over before the April 8, 1996 meeting. Zoll did not receive any 
information about Castleton that was not otherwise publicly available (and 
therefore no confidential) and Zoll did not reveal any information about 
Castleton to Ricks. Finally, Castleton did not suffer any damages based 
upon Zoll's alleged failures. At Trial and now on this Appeal, Castleton has 
failed to meet his burden of proof. Therefore, Zoll respectfully requests that 
Castleton's appeal be denied and Zoll awarded his attorney's fees and costs 
in defense of this appeal. 
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